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THE REAL SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY FRAUD(S)
Steven K. Berenson
INTRODUCTION
In early January 2014, the Manhattan District Attorney
announced the indictment of 106 individuals in conjunction with
one of the largest Social Security Disability fraud scams on
record.1 Among those indicted included a lawyer,2 a “disability
consultant” and a small number of facilitators and recruiters, each
of whom used their experience and professional expertise to
generate and process the fraudulent claims.3 Those not indicted
were doctors who generated false medical opinions in support of
the fraudulent claims.4 The bulk of the fraudulent claimants were
former New York City police officers and firefighters, many of
whom also collected disability pensions from the City.5 A large
number of the claimants alleged that their involvement in
responding to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks led them to
suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and other
mental health problems.6 However, a closer look at the lives the
claimants actually led belied their claims of disability. Indeed, one
of the main sources that helped investigators uncover the fraud
were pictures posted to the claimants’ Facebook pages showing
them skiing, boating and engaged in other activities that were
*Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, San Diego, California.
The author wishes to thank Frank Bloch, Jon Dubin, and Carwina Weng for
helpful comments on an earlier draft, and Deanna Sampson for continuing
support.
1
See, e.g., William K. Rashbaum & James C. McKinley, Jr., Charges of 106 in
Huge Fraud Over Disability, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2014, at A1; Pervaiz Shallwani
& Damian Paletta, Ex-NYPD Cops, Firefighters Charged With Disability Fraud,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2014, at A2; Hearing on the Soc. Sec. Disability Ins. Fraud
Scheme in N.Y.C., Before the Soc. Sec. Subcomm. of the H. Ways and Means
Comm., 113th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2014) (statement of Patrick P. O’Carroll, Jr.,
Inspector
Gen.
Soc.
Sec.
Admin.),
available
at
http://oig.ssa.gov/newsroom/congressional-testimony/jan16, last visited Feb. 10,
2014 (hereinafter, O’Carroll Testimony).
2
Raymond Lavallee, age 83, is a former FBI agent and was a senior prosecutor
with the Nassau County District Attorney’s office. Rashbaum & McKinley,
supra note 1, at A1.
3
Id. See also Shallwani & Paletta, supra note 1, at A2; O’Carroll Testimony,
supra note 1.
4
O’Carroll Testimony, supra note 1.
5
Rashbaum & McKinley, supra note 1, at A1; Shallwani & Paletta, supra note 1
at A2; O’Carroll Testimony, supra note 1.
6
Rashbaum & McKinley, supra note 1, at A1; Shallwani & Paletta, supra note
1, at A2; O’Carroll Testimony, supra note 1.
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clearly incompatible with their claims of disability.7
Announcement of the fraud came at a time of already great
consternation regarding the overall health of the Social Security
Disability (SSD) system. Since the economic crisis of 2008, and
the contraction of the United States employment market, the
number of SSD claims has risen dramatically.8 Aside from leading
to significant delays in the processing of such claims and a backlog
of undecided cases, the pressures put on the “trust fund”9 that pays
for social security disability benefits have caused experts to
estimate that the trust fund may become insolvent in the next few
years.10 The prognosis is significantly more bleak than the ones
that apply to the more frequently discussed Social Security
Retirement fund and the Medicare trust fund, which are estimated
to remain solvent without any changes to current laws through
2040 and 2029 respectively.11 In light of these financial pressures,
the price tag of the current fraud, approximately $21 million
dollars in fraudulent benefits paid to date, with the possibility of
much more to be uncovered,12 seems particularly troubling. The
fraud has also served to provide further fuel for long-simmering
political pressures coming from those who contend that the SSD
system is too generous and is in serious need of reform.13
Additionally, the nature of the above-mentioned recent frauds
7

Rashbaum & McKinley, supra note 1, at A1; Shallwani & Paletta, supra note
1, at A2; O’Carroll Testimony, supra note 1.
8
See Damian Paletta, Insolvency Looms, as States Drain U.S. Disability Fund,
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 19 (March 22, 2011) (hereinafter, Paletta,
Insolvency Looms).
9
The term trust fund is placed in quotes here because the government’s SSD
account is not literally a trust fund. A portion of each employee’s FICA (Federal
Insurance and Contributions Act) or social security tax payments are placed in
an SSD account. However, rather than the money remaining in that account until
the particular employee becomes disabled, the money is used to pay benefits to
persons currently receiving SSD benefits. See OFFICIAL SOCIAL SECURITY
WEBSITE,
Disability
Insurance
Trust
Fund,
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/progdata/describedi.html (last visited October 13,
2014). To the extent current revenues exceed current expenditures from the
account, the money is invested. Id. However, the account has run a deficit in
each of the past five years. Rachel Greszler, Social Security Disability Trust
Fund Will be Exhausted in Just Two Years: Beneficiaries Facing Nearly 20
Percent
Benefit
Cuts,
THE
HERITAGE
FOUNDATION,
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/08/social-security-disabilityinsurance-trust-fund-will-be-exhausted-in-just-two-years-beneficiaries-facingnearly-20-percent-cut-in-benefits (last visited October 13, 2014).
10
Paletta, Insolvency Looms, supra note 8.
11
Id.
12
Rashbaum & McKinley, supra note 1, at A1.
13
See, e.g., Jon C. Dubin & Robert E. Rains, Scapegoating Social Security
Disability Claimants (and the Judges Who Evaluate Them), 6 ADVANCE: THE J.
OF THE ACS ISSUE GROUPS 199, 199 & nn. 1-2 (2012).
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makes them particularly galling. First, the police officers and
firefighters who perpetrated the fraud had previously sworn to
uphold and defend the very laws that they broke. Second, the fact
that they exploited fears and memories of the 9/11 attacks, as well
as the suffering of so many that were genuinely scarred by those
events seems particularly cynical and reprehensible. Finally, this
particular fraud came on the heels of the announcement of at least
a couple of other large scale scams involving SSD fraud, raising
the specter of additional frauds on perhaps a scale greater than had
previously been imagined.14
The day after the indictments were handed down, D. Randall
Frye, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) with the Social Security
Administration (SSA) and the head of the Association of
Administrative Law Judges wrote an editorial for the New York
Times both decrying the fraud and suggesting a number of steps
that should be taken to reform the SSD system to make such frauds
less likely to occur in the future.15 One particular matter that Judge
Frye decried was the SSA policy, which prevents Judges, such as
himself, and other SSA employees from visiting the Facebook
pages and other social media accounts of disability claimants.16
Judge Frye intimated that without this policy, judges like him
might have been able to detect the inconsistencies between
claimants’ actual lives and their disability files that investigators
ultimately discovered in uncovering the fraud.17 Additionally,
Judge Frye criticized the fact that while attorneys often represent
claimants such as those involved in the New York fraud at their
social security hearings, the SSA is not represented by counsel.18
Thus, Judge Frye suggested that providing legal representation for
the government in all disability hearings would reduce fraudulent
and improper awards of benefits.19
Aside from the aforementioned reasons, the announcement of
the New York disability fraud scheme was particularly troubling
for yet another reason. At the time the indictments were
announced, I was serving as counsel to a claimant in a SSD case. I
run a legal clinic at Thomas Jefferson School of Law for homeless
veterans with substance abuse problems, who are participating in a
nationally recognized recovery program, Veterans Village of San
Diego.20 Most of our clients are “dual diagnosed,” meaning they
O’Carroll Testimony, supra note 1; Paletta, supra note 8.
D. Randall Frye, Fixing Disability Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2014, at A17.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
For a general description of the program, see Dale Margolin Cecka, Steven K.
Berenson, Lisa V. Martin, Karen Pearlman Raab, & Maryann Zavez,
14
15
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have at least one diagnosed mental illness in addition to their
substance abuse problem.21 We will call the claimant in this case
“Major,” a homeless veteran who served ten years in the United
States Army.22 Major had only entered the recovery program a
short period of time before he was scheduled to appear before an
ALJ for a hearing on his claim. Indeed, I first met Major about a
week before his scheduled hearing. Because I was not willing to
take Major’s case on such short notice, he and I agreed that our
clinic would represent him on the condition that we were able to
obtain a continuance of his hearing. Fortunately, the judge on the
case was willing to grant an approximate two-month continuance
to allow my students and I time to prepare.23
After the continuance was granted and I filed the SSA’s official
form designating me as Appointed Representative for Major’s
hearing, I was able to access the electronic file for the hearing.24
Given the long history of medical treatment that Major had shared
with me, the file relating to his disability application was
shockingly thin. The file only contained medical records for a short
period of time, approximately one year between the time of his
application in September 2010 and late 2011, despite Major’s
continuous treatment at the local VA hospital from late 2011 up to
early 2014. While I am not an experienced disability attorney, it
was clear that the medical records were not sufficient to support
Major’s claim and Major’s application would almost certainly have
been denied had his hearing gone forward as originally scheduled.
Indeed, Major had been denied SSD benefits several times
before.25
Empowerment, Innovation, and Service: Law School Programs Provide Access
to Justice and Instill a Commitment to Serve, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 672, 675-76
(2010); Steven K. Berenson, Homeless Veterans and Child Support, 45 FAM. L.
Q. 173, 186 (2011).
21
See Definition of Dual Diagnosis, Medline Plus, available at
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/dualdiagnosis.html, last visited May 27,
2014.
22
The details of Major’s case are deliberately kept vague throughout this article
so as to avoid violating his confidentiality rights. However, Major did consent
expressly to a general discussion of his case in this article.
23
Note that by this time more than three years had already passed since Major
filed his initial claim for benefits.
24
Social Security Form SSA-1696, available at http://www.ssa.gov/online/ssa1696.pdf, last visited, May 27, 2014. I participate in the SSA’s Appointed
Representative Services program, which allows me online access to client claim
files. See http://www.socialsecurity.gov/ar/, last visited May 27, 2014.
25
There are actually two separate types of disability benefits available from the
SSA. The first, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) is authorized by
Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. In brief, persons are
eligible to receive SSDI if they have worked a certain number of quarters within
a certain period of time. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1)(B). Taxes on their earnings
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However, any person who spoke with Major, even a short time
would conclude: 1) that he suffers from at least some form of
mental illness; and 2) his chances of obtaining a steady job are
very slim in the current U.S. economy. Even with the two-month
continuance and the assistance from the legal clinic, an estimation
of Major’s odds for receiving SSI benefits were no greater than
50%. This seeming contradiction, between the New York
claimants, who were not disabled but could, and did, obtain
benefits with relative ease, and Major, who is almost certainly
unemployable yet has been thwarted in his effort to obtain
disability benefits time and time again, only furthered my sense of
outrage over the New York fraud.
It seems to me that as a result of the publicity surrounding the
New York scam and Judge Frye’s reply, a number of “frauds” or
falsehoods about the SSD system have been reinforced. For
example, the “success” of the New York disability fraud scheme
and the discussion around it suggests that it is too easy to receive
are paid into a “trust fund” much like the Social Security Retirement fund, and
that fund is used to pay SSDI benefits. Also like Social Security Retirement
payments, the amount of SSDI benefits a person receives correlates to the level
of that person’s income during the relevant period. Additionally, Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) benefits are available under Title XVI of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, et seq. SSI is an anti-poverty program for
disabled persons. Thus, while no prior work history or payments into a fund are
required, strict income and asset restrictions do apply to SSI eligibility. For a
general description and comparison of the two programs, see Fact Sheet, Social
Security and Supplemental Security Income (SSI): What’s the Difference?,
available at http://www.ssa.gov/sf/FactSheets/aianssavsssifinalrev.pdf, last
visited June 2, 2014; Stan Hinden, AARP Bulletin, What’s the Difference
Between SSDI and SSI?, available at http://www.aarp.org/work/socialsecurity/info-06-2012/social-security-disability-insurance-supplementalsecurity-income.html, last visited June 2, 2014. It is possible for a person to
receive both SSDI and SSI, if the amount of one’s SSDI payment is sufficiently
low that it does not put the recipient over the income eligibility standard for SSI.
See Robert Rains, Disability and Family Relationships: Marriage Penalties and
Support Anomalies, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 561 (2006). Because Major had no
compensated work history following his discharge from the military nearly 20
years ago, he was ineligible for SSDI. However, his impoverishment did leave
him economically eligible for SSI. In any event, the determination of whether a
person is disabled is the same for both programs. Richard P. Weishaupt &
Robert E. Rains, Sullivan v. Zebley: New Disability Standards for Indigent
Children to Obtain Government Benefits, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 539, 547-48
(1991). Thus, I will not generally distinguish between the two programs
throughout the following discussion. Because SSI is funded separately from the
SSD trust fund out of general government revenues, and because the amount
spent on SSI benefits each year is very small in comparison to the amount spent
on SSDI benefits, SSI is only tangentially relevant to the overall fiscal
soundness of the SSD program. Disabled children may also be eligible to
receive SSI. However, throughout this article, I will only discuss the SSD
program as it applies to adults.
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disability benefits. However, a closer look at the system belies this
claim. Moreover, in many cases it is the neediest claimants and
those least able to navigate the system that finds it most difficult to
obtain benefits.
Additionally, Judge Frye and others suggest that disability
determinations would be more accurate if the SSA jettisoned its
non-adversarial, inquisitorial hearing system in favor of a more
traditional adversary adjudication model, with the SSA represented
by a lawyer, just as many claimants are. However, no actual
evidence supports the claim that an adversarial system would work
better than the inquisitorial system in making SSD determinations.
Given the potential of tremendous transaction costs involved in
changing fundamentally the world’s largest administrative
adjudicatory system, the burden of proof must be on those who
would advocate such a change to demonstrate that the benefits
would in fact outweigh the costs. Moreover, any assessment of the
future benefits of a change to an adversarial system would have to
consider that the costs of adjudication in such a system would
almost certainly increase going forward.
Many details have yet to emerge about the New York fraud
scheme, but at first blush, it appears that it focused on the
“medical” aspect of disability determinations, rather than the
vocational aspect. However, to the extent that the medical aspect of
disability determinations is flawed, the vocational aspect is
completely out of line with reality. Thus, the third fraud addressed
is the myth that the vocational aspects of disability determinations
reflect the reality of the contemporary U.S. economy.
This article addresses each of these three frauds about the SSD
program: 1) that it is too easy to obtain disability benefits;26 2) that
a fully adversarial adjudicatory system with attorney representation
for SSA would improve SSD outcomes;27 and 3) that SSD hearings
result in bona fide vocational assessments.28 After debunking the
three frauds, the article goes on to demonstrate how the results in
Major’s case to date further rebut the three frauds.29
Debunking the first two frauds addressed here does not lead to
the conclusion that major reforms are required to the current
system. After all, if it is already challenging to obtain SSD
benefits, there is no need to tighten eligibility standards, as some
have called for, to address the fiscal challenges the program
presently faces and the political pressures that have been brought
to bear upon the program. Similarly, if the critics of the current
26

See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
28
See infra Part III.
29
See infra Part IV.
27
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SSD inquisitorial adjudicatory process have failed to make the case
for a change to an adversarial system, then the current system
should remain in place. However, rebutting the fraud that the SSD
system includes bona fide vocational assessments that accurately
reflect the modern economy does call out for change to the system.
Unlike others who have suggested that the vocational aspect of the
SSD process is amenable to effective reforms,30 both my
discussion of this particular fraud, and the history of the SSA’s
inability to develop a system of reliable vocational assessments,
leads me to conclude that the vocational aspect of the SSD system
should be scrapped. Thus, only those who meet a medical standard
of disability would be found disabled. Though not its primary goal,
such a change would also greatly reduce the number of persons
who would receive SSD benefits in the future, thus alleviating both
the current fiscal and political pressures on the system. Such a
change would also be consistent with social policy in effect at least
since passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act, under which
other than those who are completely medically disabled from
working, persons with disabilities should be given the support and
accommodations necessary to allow them to participate in the
workforce.
Nonetheless, a change that would leave potentially thousands
or even millions of persons who would have been found disabled
under the existing SSD system without any public support in our
current, challenging economic environment would be less than
humane. Thus, elimination of the vocational aspects of the current
SSD system would require its replacement with a new program
that would involve job training and placement services, workplace
accommodations and support and income support throughout the
process to both displaced workers and those with disabilities that
are not severe enough to qualify for benefits under the reformed
SSD system. Thus, the article concludes by making the case for a
new entitlement program along these lines.31
I.

FRAUD # 1: IT IS TOO EASY TO GET SOCIAL
SECURITY DISABILITY BENEFITS

Formally, to obtain SSD benefits, an applicant must show an
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which
can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

30
31

See infra note 225 and accompanying text.
See infra Part V.
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months."32 At least on its face, this disability standard appears to
be significantly more stringent than that which applies to many
other disability programs, including the disability programs of
many Western European countries.33
On the other hand, the apparent ease with which the New York
disability claimants were able to secure benefits fuels the notion
that it is relatively easy to obtain social security disability benefits.
Some recent reports about the system also give credence to this
assumption. For example, a recent Wall Street Journal article
reported that in 2010 approximately 67% of the SSD cases that
went to hearing before an ALJ resulted in approval of the claim for
benefits.34 However, in 2013, that rate fell to 56%.35 This suggests
that at least to a certain extent, the system can regulate itself in
response to an increase in claims in recent years and to concerns
about the solvency of the system.36
Additionally, the relatively high success rate of claimants who
appear before ALJs obscure the fact that ALJ hearings are the third
step of an administrative process in which claimants fare less well
in the earlier two phases. First, a claim for SSD benefits starts with
an application filed by the claimant. These claims can be filed
online, by telephone, or in person at a local Social Security
office.37 These initial claims are usually reviewed by a state
Disability Determination Service.38 Between 2002 and 2010, 74%
of the disability claims filed at this level were denied.39 If denied,
the claimant may then request “reconsideration” of the denial.40 In
theory, a request for reconsideration requires a de novo review by
the state agency that made the initial denial of the application.41
However, an average of only 3% of those who sought
reconsideration of their denials between 2002 and 2010 were
32

42 USC §423(d)(1)(A).
Dubin & Rains, supra note 13, at 117; Jon C. Dubin, The Labor Market Side
of Disability-Benefits Policy and Law, 20 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 51 &
n. 217 (2011) (hereinafter, Dubin, Labor Market).
34
Damian Paletta, Government Pulls in Reins on Disability Judges, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL, at A1 (December 26, 2013).
35
Id.
36
See supra notes 8-10.
37
Oren R. Griffin, Social Security Disability Law and the Obstacles Facing
Claimants With Mental Disabilities, 36 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 147, 153
(2012)(hereinafter, Griffin, Obstacles).
38
Id.
39
Social Security Administration, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON THE SOCIAL
SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM, 2012, Chart 11, p. 143 (Feb. 26,
2014),
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/di_asr/2012/di_asr12.pdf,
(hereinafter SSA Report).
40
Griffin, Obstacles, supra note 37, at 153.
41
Id.
33
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awarded benefits at this stage of the process.42 If reconsideration is
denied, then the claimant can seek a hearing before an
administrative law judge.43 The ALJ hearing is also a de novo
review.44 Claimants who are dissatisfied with the ALJ’s decision
can invoke the final intra-agency stage of the review process, an
appeal to the Social Security Appeals Council.45 Only 13% of all
SSD claims filed between 2002 and 2010 were approved at either
the ALJ or Appeals Council stage.46 Judicial review of Appeals
Council decisions is available, but the scope of review is narrow.47
Only about 1% of SSD claims filed ever make it into the federal
court system.48 Overall, 41% of the claims filed for disability
benefits were approved between 2002 and 2010.49
Due to low levels of success at the early stages of the SSD
process, a high degree of persistence is required on behalf of
claimants to achieve ultimate success. Yet, long delays at each
phase of the process can challenge even the most determined and
persistent claimant. The average amount of time it takes to obtain a
decision on an initial application for benefits is approximately four
to six months.50 Reconsideration requests then take another three to
five months.51 It takes approximately another 14 months to get a
hearing before and ALJ, where the largest proportion of disability
applications are approved.52 This means that many successful
42

SSA Report, supra note 39, at Chart 11, p. 143. In 2006, the SSA announced
plans to scrap this second stage of the review process. See Frank S. Bloch,
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, & Paul R. Verkuil, The Social Security Administration’s
New Disability Adjudication Rules: A Significant and Promising Reform, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 235, 235 (2007) (hereinafter, Bloch, et al., New Rules).
However, these proposed reforms were never fully implemented. See Griffin,
Obstacles, supra note 37, at 152 n. 27. At present, there are ten “prototype”
states in which the reconsideration stage has been eliminated. See Jeffrey S.
Wolfe & Dale Glendening, Through the Disability Looking Glass: A Considered
Response to Professor Pashler’s Wild Social Security Hare, 44 U. MEM. L. REV.
523, 581 & n. 255 (2014); Preparing for Your Social Security Disability Appeal,
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/preparing-your-social-securitydisability-appeal.html (last visited December 31, 2014).
43
Griffin, Obstacles, supra note 37, at 153.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
SSA Report, supra note 39, at Chart 11, p. 143.
47
See Frank Bloch, BLOCH ON SOCIAL SECURITY § 6:2 (2014); Bryan C. Bond,
Note: Taking it on the Chenery: Should the Principles of Chenery I Apply in
Social Security Disability Cases?, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2157, 2170 (2011).
48
Jeannie H. Kim, Social Security Disability Law 101, 55 ORANGE COUNTY
LAW. 26 (July 2013) (hereinafter Kim, Disability 101).
49
SSA Report, supra note 39, at Chart 11, p. 143.
50
Kim, Disability 101, supra note 48, at 26. Note that the wait times mentioned
here can vary greatly among different Social Security regional offices.
51
Id.
52
Id.

Volume 8, Issue 1
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

Winter 2015
9

DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 5

DEPAUL JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

102

claimants will have to wait approximately two years to receive
their benefits. Appeals to the Appeals Council can add another 16
months on average to the process.53 If successful, claimants may
obtain paid benefits retroactive near to the original filing date of
the initial application.54 However, even retroactive benefits may
not be enough to make many claimants whole. After all, by
definition, successful claimants are deemed unable to support
themselves through employment.55 With a paucity of other public
resources available for support,56 many low-income applicants may
simply not have sufficient resources to survive the two plus year
process in order to receive funds.57
At first glance, it may seem appropriate that the highest rate of
success is at the third stage of the administrative process – the ALJ
hearing. After all, it must be the case that a large number of
completely unmeritorious requests are filed, and it is easy to weed
these applications out at the earliest stages of the process. But
those with the most meritorious claims are likely to persist, even if
it takes the claimant years and many levels of appeal before they
see their benefits.
The problem is that no empirical evidence supports this
hypothesis. We do not know which applicants do and do not persist
with their disability claims. In fact, there is reason to believe that
the applicants in most need are the least likely to persist through
the lengthy, tedious and multi-layered process of appealing an
initial denial.58 Those applicants who are poor, homeless or have
serious mental health issues are less likely to have resources to
“stay the course” and see the process through to a successful
conclusion.
In any event, it is almost certain that at each level of the
appeals process, and particularly at the early stages, many people
53

Id.
SSI benefits may be paid retroactive to the first day of the month following
the month in which the application for benefits was filed, provided the disability
standard was met as of that date. SSDI benefits may be paid up to 12 months
prior to the filing of an application, though there is a five month waiting period
after the onset of disability before payments can begin. See generally, If I Am
Determined Disabled, How Far Back Will Social Security Pay Benefits?,
SOCIAL
SECURITY
DISABILITY
&
SSI
RESOURCE
CENTER,
http://www.ssdrc.com/disabilityquestions2-84.html (last visited December 31,
2014).
55
See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (2004); Griffin, Obstacles, supra note 37, at
154-56.
56
See infra notes 194-96.
57
Griffin, Obstacles, supra note 37, at 186.
58
Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer Bankruptcy’s
Greatest Weakness May Account for Its Surprising Success, 52 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1933, 1997 n. 340 (2011).
54
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with meritorious claims merely give up, out of frustration,
despairing of their ultimate prospects for success on the claim or
simply lack the legal assistance and other resources necessary to
continue. Indeed, meritorious applicants withdrawing their claims
from the process would save the federal government money in the
long run, although it defeats the service objectives behind the
disability program. Similar processes of denial apply in a broad
range of government benefit programs. Nearly three decades ago,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) scholar Michael
Lipsky described this process as “bureaucratic disentitlement.”59
Rather than restricting access to government benefit programs at
the level of statutory or regulatory eligibility standards, access is
restricted at the lowest level of bureaucratic application of
eligibility rules, through procedural hurdles rather than substantive
eligibility requirements. While this process operates in a variety of
public benefit programs,60 a more honest approach to rationing
scarce government resources would be to tighten eligibility
standards, rather than driving otherwise eligible claimants away
through delay, frustration and obfuscation.
In Major’s case, despite substantial mental and physical health
issues, he was able to appeal from both the SSA’s initial denial of
his claim and its denial of his request for reconsideration.
However, as was supposed above with regard to at least some of
the neediest SSD applicants, Major’s limited income resulted in his
being homeless and living on the streets for most of the 42 months
between his initial application for benefits and his ALJ hearing.61
59

Michael Lipsky, Bureaucratic Disentitlement in Social Welfare Programs, 58
SOC. SERV. REV. 3 (1984).
60
Littwin, supra note 58, at 1950, 1989.
61
Major was not entirely without income throughout the relevant period. Major
received a small amount of money from the Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) for service connected disability benefits for the physical injuries resulting
from a helicopter accident he was involved in while in the military. However,
until shortly before his SSD ALJ hearing, the VA had not “connected” Major’s
mental health issues to his term of military service. Thus, he did not receive VA
disability payments for those ailments. The VA determined that Major’s
physical injuries impaired his earning capacity by 30%, thus resulting in
monthly payments of a few hundred dollars during the relevant period. Though
any retroactive SSI benefits Major would be entitled to would be offset by the
VA benefits he had received during the relevant period (after the first $20),
Major would still be entitled to SSI payments of a few hundred dollars per
month, given the monthly SSI payment amount during the relevant period. See
Understanding Supplemental Security Income – 2014 Version, OFFICIAL SOCIAL
SECURITY WEBSITE, http://www.socialsecurity.gov/ssi/text-income-ussi.htm
(last visited June 2, 2014). As will be discussed in greater detail shortly before
his SSD ALJ hearing, the VA did “service connect” Major’s depression, thus
upping his disability rating to 80%, and his monthly compensation to around
$1,500. Because this amount is greater than the SSI eligibility standard, the
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Despite frequent suggestions to the contrary, it is important to
note that a finding of disability does not automatically entitle the
claimant to a lifetime stream of benefits. If the claimant’s
condition improves, either on its own, through treatment, or
perhaps through advances in medicine or other available therapies,
the claimant is subject to having their benefits terminated with a
finding that he or she is no longer disabled.62 It may be the case
that for an individual claimant, the ALJ will order a review of the
claimant’s condition after a certain period of time following the
hearing. Additionally, the SSA has a program to conduct
Continuing Disability Reviews (CDRs) of SSD recipients to assess
their continuing eligibility to receive benefits.63 The amount of
resources the SSA has devoted to CDRs has varied a great deal
over the three decades the CDR program has been in place.64
However, critics of the SSD program focus particularly on the
promise of expanded CDRs to combat the growth in expenditures
under the program.65
In any event, the foregoing discussion makes clear that
obtaining and maintaining SSD benefits is far from a cakewalk.
Indeed, the overwhelming majority of SSD applicants are
unsuccessful, and even many with meritorious claims are not able
to sustain the often long and tortuous effort required to obtain
benefits.
II.

FRAUD # 2: AN ADVERSARY SOCIAL SECURITY
HEARING PROCESS WOULD BE PREFERABLE
Judge Frye’s primary critique of the system, one that has been

prospective aspect of Major’s SSI claim was rendered moot by his new VA
rating. However, several thousand dollars worth of claimed retroactive benefits
remained in issue at Major’s ALJ hearing. For a more detailed description of the
VA’s disability compensation system, see Steven K. Berenson, Legal Services
for Struggling Veterans – Then and Now, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 101,
117-19 (2009).
62
See William R. Morton, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) Reform:
An Overview of Proposals to Reduce the Growth in SSDI Rolls,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS 5 (2013),
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43054.pdf (last visited July 30, 2014); Drew A.
Swank, Money for Nothing: Five Small Steps to Begin the Long Journey to
Restoring Integrity to the Social Security Administration’s Disability Programs,
41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 155, 166 (2012) (hereinafter, Swank, Five Small Steps).
63
Morton, supra note 62, at 6-7; Swank, Five Small Steps, supra note 62, at 166.
64
Morton, supra note 62, at 6-7; Swank, Five Small Steps, supra note 62, at 166.
65
Swank, Five Small Steps, supra note 62, at 166; Wolfe & Glendening, supra
note 42, at 587.
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made by other commentators, 66 is that the SSD system would be
improved if its current “inquisitorial” approach were replaced with
an “adversarial” approach more consistent with that used in
American courts.67 The fundamental differences between
inquisitorial and adversary systems lie in the roles of the legal
advocates and the judges. In adversarial systems, at least as ideally
constituted, each party to the dispute is represented by a skilled
advocate, whose role is to present the evidence most advantageous
to the party represented by the advocate, and to challenge the
evidence presented by the other side.68 The advocate’s duties run
primarily to the represented party and the advocate has no duty to
assist the opposing party, and in fact may be prohibited from
introducing evidence that may undermine their client’s position in
the dispute.69 Because the evidence of each side’s evidence is
presented effectively through this format, the role of the judge is
passive in the in adversarial systems. The judge has no authority to
seek out evidence, or to conduct an independent investigation
separate from the presentations made by each party’s advocate.
The judge simply renders an impartial decision based on the
presented evidence.
66

See, e.g., David Autor & Mark Duggan, The Growth in the Social Security
Disability Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 93 (2006);
Wolfe & Glendening, supra note 42, at 584.
67
See supra note 15 and accompanying text. These suggestions are also not new.
In the early 1980s, the Social Security Administration Representation Project
(SSARP) was launched in five regional SSA offices. See Frank S. Bloch, Jeffrey
S. Lubbers, & Paul R. Verkuil, Developing a Full And Fair Evidentiary Record
in a Non-Adversary Setting: Two Proposals for Improving Social Security
Disability Adjudications, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 42 (2003) (hereinafter Bloch,
et al., Full and Fair). However, the Project was enjoined by a Federal District
Court on grounds that it unconstitutionally deprived claimants of their
procedural due process rights, and violated both the Social Security Act and its
implementing regulations. Salling v. Bowen, 641 F. Supp. 1046 (W.D. Va.
1986). Among its findings, the Court determined that attorney representation for
the SSA in the demonstration cities increased the amount of time it took to
decide cases, increased reversal rates of ALJ decisions, failed to achieve
uniformity of decisions among ALJs, failed to achieve full and fair development
of case files, and failed to improve hearing quality more generally. Id. at 106164. For a discussion and mild critique of this decision, see Bloch, et al., Full and
Fair, supra at 50-52. Thank you to Jon Dubin for bringing this decision to my
attention.
68
See generally, David Luban, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 27 (2007);
Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial
Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L.
REV. 1, 17-20 (2004) (hereinafter, Camp, Inquisitorial Process); Jon C. Dubin,
Torquemada Meets Kafka: The Misapplication of the Issue Exhaustion Doctrine
to Inquisitorial Administrative Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1289, 1300
(1997) (hereinafter, Dubin, Issue Exhaustion).
69
Luban, supra note 68, at 27.
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By contrast, in an inquisitorial system, the judge, rather than
the parties’ representative is the primary authority for development
of the record.70 Thus, the judge plays a much more active role in
framing the legal issues, participating in the discovery and
presentation of evidence and in the overall conduct of the
proceedings.71 As a result of the enhanced judicial role, the roles of
the parties’ advocates are correspondingly decreased. The parties’
advocates serve to aid the judge’s inquiry into the matter, rather
than to direct the course of the proceedings.
As stated above, most American judicial systems follow an
adversarial model. By contrast, the inquisitorial model dominates
in Europe and many Latin American judicial systems.72 Indeed,
many common features of adversarial models are enshrined in the
U.S. Constitution. Although such features primarily relate to
criminal proceedings such as the right to counsel, the rights to call
and cross-examine witnesses, the right to a jury trial, the right not
to testify against oneself and the right to confront one’s accusers.73
The debate on the relative merits of inquisitorial versus
adversarial systems has been longstanding, and has not resulted in
a clear winner.74 Legal Ethics scholar David Luban has
persuasively argued that since a clear case has not been made on
the merits for either system, the transaction costs that would be
incurred in switching from one system to the other cannot be
justified regardless of which system is in place.75
The question of adjudication costs is particularly pressing in
the context of SSD hearings, which have been described as the
largest administrative adjudicatory system in the world.76
Certainly, adversary hearings, with both sides represented by
counsel, would take longer and add to the cost of the SSA’s
adjudicatory system.77 Consolidation of the record development,
fact-finding, issue spotting and decision making roles in the SSD
ALJ results in efficiencies which, if sacrificed across the huge
number of SSD cases decided each year, could result in massive
cost increases to a system that is already in financial crisis.78
70

Camp, Inquisitorial Process, supra note 68, at 18; Dubin, Issue Exhaustion,
supra note 68, at 1300.
71
Dubin, Issue Exhaustion, supra note 68, at 1303; Vicki Lens, Revisiting the
Promise of Kelly v. Goldberg in the Era of Welfare Reform, 21 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 43, 84 (2013).
72
Dubin, Issue Exhaustion, supra note 68, at 1300.
73
These rights are generally not recognized in inquisitorial systems.
74
See Luban, supra note 68, at 19-64.
75
Luban, supra note 68, at 56.
76
Dubin, Issue Exhaustion, supra note 68, at 1291 (citations omitted).
77
Dubin, Issue Exhaustion, supra note 68, at 1318. See also Morton, supra note
62, at 26.
78
Dubin, Issue Exhaustion, supra note 68, at 1320.
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The inquisitorial approach in SSD hearings seems to be
justified on philosophical grounds as well. As Luban79 and other
scholars have pointed out,80 the argument for the adversarial
system is strongest as it relates to criminal law. Perhaps the
greatest strength of the adversarial system is the ability to
effectively safeguard the rights of the accused.81 Indeed, we
tolerate significant restrictions on prosecutors’ ability to secure
convictions in the name of protecting defendants’ rights. Yet this
seems appropriate to us in a liberal democracy such as the United
States, where government overreach is viewed as a greater threat
than failure to punish guilty criminals.82 Better one hundred guilty
go free than one innocent is convicted.83
By contrast, the adversary system is not as justified in civil
cases between private parties, where government overreach is not a
concern.84 In this regard, it may seem that administrative cases are
more analogous to criminal cases than civil cases because the
proceeding is between a citizen and the state. Indeed, for some
administrative proceedings, such as deportation cases, where the
potential for government overreach is great, the analogy to
criminal cases may be strong.85 However, the analogy does not
hold for SSD and other public benefit cases. Rather than the state
seeking to impose unwanted action upon a citizen who did not seek
the assistance of the state, SSD cases involve citizens affirmatively
seeking the assistance of the government.86 In such cases, it may
well be that an inquisitorial approach is preferable, as it better
allows the government adjudicator the opportunity to protect the
public interest in safeguarding limited government resources, while
at the same time serving the social safety net objectives of the

79

Luban, supra note 68, at 28-29.
See, e.g. Deborah Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Law Practice, 37
STANFORD L. REV. 589, 605 (1985); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 12 (1975).
81
Luban, supra note 68, at 29.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Luban, supra note 68, at 30.
85
Luban, supra note 68, at 31.
86
Though this argument applies strongly to SSI cases there is a wrinkle in SSDI
cases, where the applicant at least in part seeks to recoup their own contributions
to the system. In other words, whereas the SSI applicant seeks government
assistance entirely, the SSDI applicant can claim an entitlement to resources
based upon their prior contributions. However, the Social Security system,
which includes both its retirement and its disability components, has always
combined aspects of social insurance and public assistance, and a successful
SSD or Social Security retirement claimant will often receive much more in
benefits than they contributed to the trust fund. Thus, the inquisitorial system is
warranted in this situation too.
80
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program.87
Decades ago, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the SSA’s inquisitorial system against a due
process challenge.88 In that case the SSA itself argued that a move
to an adversarial process would not necessarily benefit claimants.89
A shift to an adversarial system would be incompatible with
Judge Frye’s other recommendation of giving ALJs the authority
to view claimants’ Facebook and other social media presentations
to search for evidence incompatible with their claim of being
“disabled.” While such independent inquiry by a judge, at least
theoretically, aligns with a judge’s role under the current
inquisitorial model, it would be completely inconsistent with the
passive role of the judge embodied in the adversarial approach
advocated by Judge Frye.
The two major inquisitorial adjudicatory systems in the United
States are the SSD system and the disability compensation
program utilized by the Department of Veterans Affairs to pay
benefits to disabled veterans.90 However, not all administrative
benefits systems in the U.S. operate through an inquisitorial
system. In fact, following the United States Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in Goldberg v. Kelly,91 most “public welfare”
benefit systems in the United States. operate through an adversarial
model.92 However, following a recent empirical study of the
effectiveness of administrative hearings, at least one scholar has
called for public welfare hearings to move toward the inquisitorial
model used by SSA, rather than the opposite movement suggested
by Judge Frye and others.93 Other scholars have also touted the
benefits of inquisitorial systems for large administrative
bureaucracies.94
One of Judge Frye’s major reasons to move to adversarial
proceedings in SSI cases is that most claimants are represented by
counsel in ALJ hearings, which he argues throws off the balance
87

Accord Bloch, et al., Full and Fair, supra note 67, at 56-57.
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
89
Dubin, Issue Exhaustion, supra note 68, at 1305 & n.80 (citing to the SSA’s
Supreme Court brief).
90
For a very brief description of the VA’s “non-adversarial” disability
determination process, see Berenson, Legal Services, supra note 61, at 118-24.
91
397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg, the Court held that Constitutional Due
Process requirements had to be observed before a state may terminate an
individual’s welfare benefits. Id.
92
Lens, supra note 71, at 43.
93
Id. at 83.
94
See Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of Adversary Process in the Administrative
State, 84 IND. L.J. 57 (2009) (advocating an inquisitorial system for IRS
Collection Due Process proceedings); Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of
Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
88
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presumed in inquisitorial proceedings. However, further inquiry
must be conducted into both the contentions that claimants are
effectively represented by lawyers in SSD hearings and that the
government is not.
First, it is simply incorrect to suggest that the government’s
interests are inadequately represented in SSD proceedings. As
previously discussed, given that the vast majority of claims are
rejected at the first two stages of the claim process, one can
certainly not say that the government’s interests in protecting the
public first are inadequately represented at those stages of the
process. Further at the ALJ stage, though separate counsel does not
represent the government, the ALJ is expressly charged with
protecting the government’s interests.95 Representing the
government’s interests is not the only obligation the ALJ has in
administrative hearings. Thus, the ALJ has responsibilities to
develop the case record fully, to assist claimants to present their
case to the extent necessary and to issue a fair and well-reasoned
decision on the merits.96 However, in cases where the claimant is
represented by counsel, the ALJ’s need to assist the claimant is
much less pronounced, and the ALJ’s role lends itself to serving as
a representative of the Administration more than would be the case
if the claimant were unrepresented.
Additionally, at this stage, unlike a typical judge, SSD ALJs
are employees of one of the parties to the proceeding. While steps
have been taken to insure the independence of SSD ALJs,97 these
steps are imperfect, and there are instances of pressure bearing on
ALJs by the agency to address issues in certain ways that are well
documented.98 It is no stretch to observe that SSD ALJs are smart
enough to know who “butters their bread.”99
Decades ago in a now-canonical article, Professor Marc
Galanter addressed the question of why certain parties seemed to

95

Dubin, Issue Exhaustion, supra note 68, at 1303.
These three distinct responsibilities have led to descriptions of Social Security
ALJ’s “wearing three hats,” or descriptions of SSD hearings as “the three hat
system.” See Bloch, Full and Fair, supra note 67, at nn. 228 & 238; Bernard
Schwartz, Adjudication and the Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J.
203, 208-09 (1996).
97
Jacob Bender, Note & Comments, Torn Between Two Masters: Flaws In The
Social Security Disability Process, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 619, 630 (2014).
98
Wolfe & Glendening, supra note 42, at 591.
99
See, e.g., Karen S. Lewis, Comment, Administrative Law Judges and the Code
of Judicial Conduct: A Need for a Regulated Ethics, 94 DICK. L. REV. 929,
957 (1990) (arguing that the primary threat to an ALJ's impartiality is their
status as an employee of the agency, where they are subject to pressures to
conform to agency standards and practices).
96
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be much more successful than others in litigation.100 In doing so,
Galanter drew a distinction between “repeat players,” and “oneshotters.”101 Repeat players are those who litigate frequently in a
given forum, whereas one-shotters litigate infrequently in the
forum.102 As a result, repeat players develop experience and
expertise in the forum that can overmatch one-shotters when they
appear on opposite sides of a dispute. Additionally, repeat players
tend to be large institutional entities, possessed of great resources,
whereas one-shotters tend to be individuals with limited
resources.103 Given both the frequency of their appearances in the
forum, and their available resources, repeat players have an interest
in investing and developing their advantages over one-shotters in
the forum.104 Furthermore, over the course of their repeated
appearances in the forum, repeat players can influence the “rules of
the game,” to their advantage, through developing legal precedents
and challenging and appealing certain disadvantageous
decisions.105 Of course, this further exacerbates the advantages the
repeat players hold over the one-timers in the forum. As a result,
the “haves come out ahead,” as the title to Galanter’s article
suggests.
Galanter’s views have been affirmed in numerous contexts
over the past four decades.106 Of course, with regard to SSD
hearings, the SSA is a classic repeat player, while the claimants
who appear before it are classic one-shotters.107 In this regard, it is
not significant that the SSA is not separately represented by an
attorney in SSD hearings. Indeed, in a number of contexts, repeat
players are able to exploit the numerous advantages they hold over
one-timers without the benefit of attorney representation. For
example, landlords are generally not represented by attorneys in
housing court, but the dramatic advantages that landlords hold over
Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC. REV. 95 (1974).
101
Id. at 97.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 98.
104
Id. at 98-99.
105
Id. at 100.
106
See, e.g., IN LITIGATION: DO THE HAVES STILL COME OUT AHEAD? (Herbert
Kritzer & Susan Silbey eds. 2004); Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C.
Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court: Speculations on the Organizational
Internalization of Law, 33 Law & Soc'y Rev. 941 (1999); Shauhin Taulesh, How
the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in the Twenty-First Century, 62 DEPAUL L. REV.
519 (2013).
107
See Erfat Massrey Cogan, Note, Executive Nonacquiescence: Problems of
Statutory Interpretation and Executive Power, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1167
(1987). See also Paris Baldacci, A Full and Fair Hearing: The Role of the ALJ
in Assisting the Pro Se Litigant, 27 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 447,
482 (2007); Lens, supra note 71, at 77.
100
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tenants in this forum are well known.108 The lower level
bureaucrats who represent the SSA at the lower stages of the SSD
claims process and ALJs at administrative hearings are more than
sufficient to cement the huge institutional advantages the SSA
holds over claimants in the SSD application process.
Perhaps providing experienced legal representatives on behalf
of claimants would help to narrow the gap between the repeat
player SSA and its one-shotter claimants. Yet Galanter contended
that for a variety of reasons, legal representation would only go so
far in narrowing the gap.109 He also suggested that adding lawyers
for the repeat player (the SSA in our case) as Judge Frye
recommends would produce greater benefits for the repeat player
than similarly providing counsel for the one-shotter will.110 Thus,
Judge Frye’s proposal would further exacerbate the advantages
already enjoyed by the administration in ALJ hearings.
A closer look at the manner in which representation is provided
in SSD cases further undermines Judge Frye’s contention that
claimants’ counsel overmatches the agency. First, fewer claimants
are represented by counsel at the first two stages of the SSD
application process than at the ALJ stage. Thus, for reasons
discussed above, many claimants will drop out of the process
before they even have an opportunity to consult with an attorney.
Second, about 20% of SSD claimants still go unrepresented at the
hearing stage.111 For reasons posited by Galanter and his progeny,
such self-represented claimants are the most heavily out-gunned at
the hearing stage. Also, for reasons described in greater detail
below, the most vulnerable claimants with the most challenging
claims are most likely to appear without counsel at their ALJ
hearings. This makes the task facing such claimants all the more
difficult.
A great disparity exists in the quality of representation
available to claimants for ALJ hearings, even for those who are
able to obtain representation, at this stage of the process. First,
SSD hearings are one of the few adjudicatory forums in which
claimants’ representatives do not need to be licensed attorneys.112
In fact, non-lawyers represent a large percentage of represented

108

See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and
Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV.
533 (1992).
109
Galanter, supra note 100, at 114.
110
Id.
111
Wolfe & Glendening, supra note 42, at 542.
112
See Drew A. Swank, Non-Attorney Social Security Disability Representatives
and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 223 (2012)(hereinafter
Swank, Non-Attorney).
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parties in SSD hearings.113 A lay advocate is not necessarily
ineffective when representing a claimant in an adjudicatory
proceeding. To the contrary, many commentators have suggested
that non-lawyer representation may be a critical component to
narrowing the “justice gap” in America – the gap between low and
moderate income Americans’ needs for legal assistance and their
ability to obtain such assistance in the current market for legal
services.114 Nonetheless, it is undeniable that attorneys receive
training, consisting of a minimum of three years of law school
education and are tested for basic competency by a state sponsored
bar examination, in a way that provides at least some quality
assurance that does not apply to lay advocates. Further, in the case
of SSD hearings, there are no formal educational or training
requirements that apply to lay advocates.115 Thus, to the extent
Judge Frye’s recommended reforms will result in highly trained
and experienced SSA lawyers facing off against untrained and
unexamined lay advocates, one can hardly expect the sort of “fair
fight” that Judge Frye implies will result.
With regard to the “justice gap,” some might be surprised to
know that most SSD claimants are represented at all of their
hearings. After all, because they are unemployed at the time they
apply for benefits, and often have been unemployed for years by
the time of their ALJ hearing, SSD claimants are unlikely able to
afford a retainer fee to hire an attorney to represent them.
However, understanding how representatives’ fees are paid out
following SSD ALJ hearings is critical to understanding why most
claimants are represented at AJL hearings. Similar examples of
representation include parties in most tort cases, as opposed to the
vast majority of parties who go unrepresented regarding most of
the other types of legal cases that involve low-income litigants.116
As previously referenced, if an applicant is successful at the
113

Former SSD ALJ Drew Swank put that figure at between 11 and 14 percent,
drawing on data from 2006 and 2007. Id. at 234-35 nn. 88-89. There is reason to
believe that this number has increased in subsequent years. See infra, nn. 123-27
and accompanying text.
114
See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 135 (2000); Tom Lininger, Deregulating Public Interest
Law, 88 TUL. L. REV. 727, 750, (2014); Daniel C.W. Lang, Note, Utilizing
Nonlawyer Advocates to Bridge the Justice Gap in America, 17 WIDENER L.
REV. 289 (2011).
115
Swank, Non-Attorney, supra note 112, at 239. Non-attorney advocates who
wish to be paid a fee directly from the claimant’s recovery from the SSA do
have to pass a test and meet other education and training requirements in order
to be eligible for direct payment. Id.
116
See generally, Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law Residency Program?: A
Modest Proposal In Response to the Burdens Created by Self-Represented
Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 105, 107-12 (2001).
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ALJ hearing stage, they could receive benefits retroactive to, near
to, or even before the original date of their application.117 Given
the delays in the SSD process, this may result in a payment of three
or four years’ worth of retroactive benefits. For example, as
mentioned above, Major waited 42 months between his original
application date and his ALJ hearing. Even for an SSI claim, where
the monthly payment amount is around $700, a 41 month
retroactive payment will result in approximately a $30,000 award
to the claimant.118 This, of course, is enough of a recovery from
which to generate a contingent fee significant enough to encourage
a representative to take on the case on such a basis.119
However, before concluding that SSD cases present windfall
opportunities to lawyers, as is often argued regarding contingent
fees in tort cases, a closer look at how contingent fees in SSD cases
work is required. First, contingent fees in SSD cases are generally
capped at 25% of the amount of the retroactive benefit award.120
117

See supra note 54.
As mentioned above, see supra note 61, any retroactive award to Major
would have been reduced by the approximately $24,000 in VA benefits that
Major received during that period. Thus, Major’s retroactive award would have
been closer to $6,000.
119
It appears that some of the claimants’ representatives in the NYC scam also
got paid a percentage or a flat fee out of claimants’ prospective benefits in
addition to getting their share of the back benefits. O’Carroll Testimony, supra
note 1, at 4. This was another impermissible aspect of the scam.
120
Damian Paletta & Dionne Searcey, Two Lawyers Strike Gold in the U.S.
Disability System, THE WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2011), at 3 (hereinafter, Paletta &
Searcey, Two Lawyers Strike Gold); Swank, Non-Attorney, supra note 112, at
243 & n.125; Wolfe & Glendening, supra note 42, at 578. There are actually
two mutually exclusive ways in which a representative may be paid a fee in an
SSD case. These are the fee agreement process and the fee petition process. See
SSA’s Fee Authorization Process, Social Security Website, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/representation/overview.htm#a0=0&sb=1,
last
visited
January 5, 2015. Under the fee agreement process, the claimant and
representative file a written fee agreement with the SSA prior to a decision
favorable to the claimant. In such circumstances, the representative’s fee is
limited to 25% of the retroactive benefit award, or $6,000, whichever is lower.
See
Fee
Agreements,
Social
Security
Website,
available
at
http://www.ssa.gov/representation/fee_agreements.htm#a0=0,
last
visited
January 5, 2015; When Can a Social Security Lawyer Take More than $6000 of
Your Backpay?, available at http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/when-cansocial-security-disability-lawyer-take-more-than-6000-your-backpay.html, last
visited January 5, 2015 (hereinafter, Backpay). The vast majority of SSD cases
that involve a payment of benefits at the ALJ stage involve fee agreements.
Where no fee agreement is in effect, a representative may be paid pursuant to a
fee petition. See The Fee Petition Process, Social Security website, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/representation/fee_petitions.htm#a0=0, last visited January
5, 2015 (hereinafter Fee Petitions). Fee petitions are most common in two
situations: 1) where the claimant fired a previous attorney with whom the
claimant had a fee agreement and the new attorney wishes to be paid (the fee
118
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That is in contrast to the typical 1/3 or 40% contingency fees that
are charged in tort cases that do not settle prior to a hearing.
Further, there is a cap on the total amount that can be deducted
from a retroactive award at $6,000.121 Thus, even in the typical SSI
case discussed above, where a 25% contingent fee of a back pay
amount of $30,000 would amount to $7,500, the lawyer’s recovery
will be capped at $6,000. In the typical SSDI case, where the back
pay amount may be significantly higher,122 the lawyer’s fee will
nonetheless be capped at $6,000.
Reflecting on these numbers, it becomes clear that SSD
representation will only be cost effective for lawyers if they: 1)
spend a relatively small amount of time on any given case; 2)
handle a high volume of cases; and 3) “cherry-pick” cases with a
high probability of success, and avoid cases with a low probability
of success (which are unlikely to pay any fee at all). As to the latter
point, it becomes clear why Major went without legal
representation for so long across his multiple and most recent SSI
claims. Claimants with obvious, usually physical injuries are much
more likely to provide, at least from the lawyer’s perspective – a
large fee, with relatively little effort involved. By contrast, obscure
ailments, such as the mental health issues that plague Major, are
harder to prove, require more effort on the part of lawyers and
therefore are less cost effective to pursue. Thus, as suggested
earlier, it is truly the most vulnerable claimants who are the most
likely to need the assistance, and who are most likely to go
unrepresented at their ALJ hearings.
Given the above-described economics of representation in SSD
cases, it should not be surprising that it appears that non-attorney
representation is increasing relative to attorney representation. The
largest providers of representation in SSD cases are large, national
firms that rely heavily on non-attorney advocates to represent their
clients. The largest of these firms is Binder and Binder. The Binder
firm is well known throughout the country as a result of its heavy
must be apportioned between the two attorneys); and 2) where the case proceeds
beyond the ALJ stage, to the Appeals Council or even to Federal Court. See
Backpay, supra. In fee petition cases, the SSA determines a fee based on the fair
value of the services provided by the representative. Id. See also Fee Petitions,
supra. Because of the greater amount of work involved in cases that go beyond
the ALJ level, fee awards in fee petition cases may exceed the $6,000 amount.
See Backpay, supra. However, because, as pointed out earlier, the number of
claimants plummets at each successive level of review, relatively few cases
involve fees of these higher amounts.
121
Paletta & Searcey, Two Lawyers Strike it Rich, supra note 120, at 3. Swank,
Non-Attorney, supra note 112, at 243 & n.125.
122
The Wall Street Journal reported that the average SSDI monthly benefit
amount was a little more than $1,000 in 2009. See Paletta, Insolvency Looms,
supra note 8, at 2.
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investment in television advertising.123 In 2010, Binder and Binder
collected $88 million in representative fees from the SSA.124 Given
the $6,000 cap in most cases, that adds up to a lot of clients.
Evidence from a lawsuit with a competitor indicated that Binder
and Binder represented about 200,000 claimants between 2001 and
2010.125 Reliance on non-lawyer advocates is a large part of
Binder’s business model since, such non-attorneys cost less to
employ than attorneys.126 Similarly, other large national firms such
as Disability Group, Inc., rely on non-attorney representation as a
core component of their business models.127
Certainly, there are advantages to being represented by a large,
national organization like Binder and Binder or Disability Group.
Given the number of cases handled by the firms, it is certain that
such organizations have developed expertise relating to SSD law,
as well as economies of scale for handling such cases efficiently
and effectively. Indeed, both firms offer the testimonials of many
satisfied clients who were able to obtain SSD benefits with the
assistance of these firms, often after years of failing to obtain such
benefits on their own.128
On the other hand, the above-described economics of SSD
practice place tremendous constraints on the amount of time that
any advocate can spend on most individual SSD cases. Thus, it is
not uncommon for an advocate to meet their SSD client for the
first time on the day of their ALJ hearing.129 Sometimes, advocates
even have to ask SSA personnel to introduce them to their own
clients immediately prior to the hearing.130 Such advocates often
know very little about the specifics of their clients’ cases. They
often question their clients and other witnesses before the ALJ
using a standard list of questions provided by their employer and
deliver the same boilerplate closing argument in every case.131 This
is certainly a far cry from the prevailing lore of the ideal attorneyclient relationship, with lawyers getting to know their clients and
their clients’ cases on a deeper level and on an individual basis, so
that the lawyer can provide expert counseling and advocacy that is

123

Paletta & Searcey, Two Lawyers Strike Gold, supra note 120, at 1.
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
See BINDER & BINDER, http://www.binderandbinder.com (last visited Jan.
6,
2015);
Testimonials,
DISABILITY
GROUP,
INC.,
http://www.disabilitygroup.com/testimonials.asp (last visited Jan. 6, 2015).
129
Swank, Non-Attorney, supra note 112, at 223.
130
Id.
131
Id.
124
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tailored to the particular circumstances of the client and the case.132
Thus, the picture that Judge Frye presents in touting a move to an
adversary system of two experienced and well versed attorneys
fighting it out in classic adversary hearing mode is not founded in
reality.
There is no doubt that there are many individual lawyer and
non-lawyer advocates who do an outstanding job on behalf of their
SSD clients and who put forth the necessary time and effort to
provide such fruitful representation. Indeed, SSD practice has
historically been a core component of many legal aid and legal
services practices, and lawyer and non-lawyer advocates who work
in these offices usually do not take fees from their clients for such
representation; therefore, they are largely immune to the economic
forces described above. But legal aid and legal services offices and
law school clinics represent a relatively small share of the overall
pool of SSD applicants. As discussed, it was mere chance that
Major ended up in a recovery program affiliated with a law school
clinic. But for that serendipity, Major likely would have headed
into his ALJ hearing without representation, as he had previously
when his applications for benefits were denied.
Given the inquisitorial nature of SSD hearings, authority
suggests that attorneys for claimants have a duty to provide all
relevant information to the ALJ, even if it would be damaging to
their client.133 As noted, this is inconsistent with a lawyer’s typical
partisan duties in an adversary system. A move to a full adversary
system along the lines that Judge Frye advocates would likely
obviate this duty, and might actually reduce the amount of relevant
evidence ALJs have on which to base their decisions.
For the foregoing reasons, Judge Frye and others have failed to
make the affirmative case for a change to an adversary SSD
hearing system. Given the various costs that would be imposed by
a change to such a system, the burden of proof lies with those who
would advocate for such a change. It is burden they have failed to
carry.
III.

FRAUD # 3: SOCIAL SECURITY’S VOCATIONAL
ASSESSMENTS REFLECT THE REAL ECONOMY
SSA ALJ hearings employ a five-step sequential evaluation

132

See generally Steven K. Berenson, From the Ashes of the Lawyer-Statesman
Rises the Lawyer-Democrat: Practical Legal Wisdom from the Ground Up,
2014 J. OF THE PROF. LAW. 17, 27.
133
Robert E. Rains, Professional Responsibility and Social Security
Representation: The Myth of the State-Bar Bar to Compliance with Federal
Rules on Production of Adverse Evidence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 363, 374 (2007).
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process in determining whether a claimant is disabled.134 First, the
Judge asks whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful
activity.”135 If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful
activity (SGA), they will be found “not disabled.”136 SGA is
determined based upon the amount of one’s earnings from
employment. For 2015, if a sighted person earns more than $1,090
per month,137 they will be determined to be engaged in SGA and
will be found not to be disabled. Thus, at the current federal
minimum wage of $7.25 per hour,138 a person will not be found to
be disabled if the person who works an average of 35 hours per
week. If a person makes less than the SGA threshold, they will
proceed to the second step of the sequential evaluation process.
Second, a judge must determine if the claimant has a “’severe’
medically determinable mental or physical impairment.”139 Use of
the term “severe” would seem to imply that a fairly significant
threshold must be met in order to satisfy this step of the process. In
fact, however, the medical inquiry at this second stage of the
disability evaluation process is quite de minimus. According to
SSD regulations, impairment is severe if it “significantly limit[s]”
a person’s “mental or physical ability to do basic work
activities.”140 In practice, virtually any identifiable medical
condition, whether mental or physical, will be found to rise to the
level of severity required to allow the claimant to progress to the
next step of the evaluation process.141
The third step represents a major hurdle for claimants, in that it
See Frank S. Bloch, Medical Proof, Social Policy, and Social Security’s
Medically Centered Definition of Disability, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 189, 211
(2007) (hereinafter, Bloch, Medically Centered); Jon C. Dubin, Overcoming
Gridlock: Campbell After a Quarter-Century and Bureaucratically Rational
Gap Filling in Mass Justice Adjudication in the Social Security Administration’s
Disability Programs, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 937, 972 (2010) (hereinafter, Dubin,
Gridlock); Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 50; Griffin, supra note 37, at
154-55.
135
Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 212; Dubin, Gridlock, supra
note 134, at 973; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 32; Griffin, supra note
37, at 155; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1571.
136
Griffin, supra note 37, at 155.
137
See
Substantial
Gainful
Activity,
SSA,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/oact/COLA/sga.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2015)
(“The monthly SGA amount for statutorily blind individuals for 2015 is
$1,820.”).
138
Wage
and
Hour
Division,
DEP’T
OF
LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/whd/minimumwage.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
139
Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 212. See also Dubin, Gridlock,
supra note 134, at 973; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 32; Griffin,
supra note 37, at 155.
140
20 C.F.R. § 404.1521.
141
Dubin, Gridlock, supra note 134, at 973.
134
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asks whether the claimant’s disability rises to the level of one of
the SSA’s “listing of impairments.”142 The SSA has propounded
listings of a variety of medical impairments, along with the criteria
that must be satisfied in order for the listing to be “met.”143 These
standards for meeting a listing are significantly high.144 The
standards are set up so that a determination that the claimant meets
a listing is conclusive as to an inability to work, and therefore a
claimant who meets a listing is determined to be disabled at this
step of the evaluation process without regard to the claimant’s age,
education level or prior work experience, and with no need to
proceed to the final two steps of the process.145 Even if a
claimant’s disability does not “meet” a specific listing, if the
claimant’s disability is “equivalent” to a listing, meaning that “it is
at least equal in severity and duration to the criteria of any listed
impairment[,]” the claimant will be found to be disabled at this
stage of the process.146
However, if the claimant’s medical issues are not significant
enough to rise to the level of meeting or equaling one of the
listings,147 the ALJ must proceed to the fourth step of the
evaluation process. This, along with the final step in the process
explicitly brings the question of vocational assessments into the
mix, and focuses on the claimant’s residual functional capacity
(RFC).148 The claimant’s RFC is the claimant’s remaining ability
to perform certain work functions despite the claimant’s
impairments.149 The fourth step in the evaluation process asks
whether, given the claimant’s RFC, the claimant can return to her

142

Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 212; Dubin, Gridlock, supra
note 134, at 973-74; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 32-33; Griffin,
supra note 37, at 155.
143
Listing
of
impairments,
SSA
http://www.ssa.gov/disability/professionals/bluebook/AdultListings.htm
(last
visited Mar. 24, 2014).
144
Dubin, Gridlock, supra note 134, at 974; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note
33, at 33.
145
Id.
146
See BLOCH ON SOCIAL SECURITY § 3:26, quoting 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1526(a), 416.926(a).
147
Multiple impairments can be aggregated so that even if no one impairment
alone meets a listing, the cumulative effect may be equivalent to a listing and
thus may result in a finding of disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.923.
148
Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 213; Dubin, Gridlock, supra
note 134, at 974; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 33; Griffin, supra note
37, at 156.
149
Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 213; Dubin, Gridlock, supra
note 134, at 974; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 33; Griffin, supra note
37, at 156.
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prior work.150 If the answer to this is yes, the claimant is not
disabled, because by definition they should be able to return to
prior work and the ALJ does not proceed to step five.151 However,
if the answer is no, then the final step in the evaluation asks
whether, based on the claimant’s RFC, their age, education level
and prior work experience, they can perform any job available in
significant numbers in the national economy.152 If the answer to
this question is yes, then the claimant is not disabled.153
These final two steps of the evaluation process are to a large
degree mandated by the language of the Social Security Act itself.
The Act states:
An individual shall be determined to be under a
disability only if his physical or mental impairment
or impairments are of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy,
regardless of whether such work exists in the
immediate area in which he lives, or whether a
specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he
would be hired if he applied for work.154
The 1967 Social Security Amendments added the provision to the
Act.155 For the first time, this language made explicit the mandate
that a vocational assessment is a necessary part of the disability
determination process.156 One key to the determination of
disability at the final stage of the process is the Medical Vocational
Disability Guidelines, or Grids promulgated by the SSA.157 The
Grids are a series of tables that specify, given the claimant’s RFC,
their age, level of education and prior work experience, whether a
150

Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 213; Dubin, Gridlock, supra
note 134, at 975; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 34; Griffin, supra note
37, at 156.
151
Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 213; Dubin, Gridlock, supra
note 134, at 975; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 34; Griffin, supra note
37, at 156.
152
Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 213; Dubin, Gridlock, supra
note 134, at 976; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 34; Griffin, supra note
37, at 156.
153
Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 213; Dubin, Gridlock, supra
note 134, at 975; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 34; Griffin, supra note
37, at 156.
154
42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A) (2006).
155
Dubin, Gridlock, supra note 134, at 948; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note
33, at 23-24.
156
Dubin, Gridlock, supra note 134, at 948; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note
33, at 25.
157
Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134 on Social Security § 3:31.
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sufficient number of jobs exist in the national economy to satisfy
the statutory standard set forth above for determining a person not
to be disabled.158
A look at how the grids applied in Major’s case will clarify
their use. A claimant’s physical RFC is a determination of their
strength related capacity to engage in activities that may be
required of certain occupations, including the ability to sit or stand
for specified durations of time, and the ability to walk, lift, carry,
push or pull certain amounts of weight.159 Various combinations of
different ability levels with regard to each of these tasks are taken
to describe the ability to perform different types of work. Thus, a
person is deemed able to perform sedentary work if the person can
sit for up to six hours in an eight hour work day, stand and walk for
up to two hours and lift up to ten pounds occasionally.160 “Light
work involves standing and walking for up to six hours and lifting
up to twenty pounds with pushing and pulling of arm and leg
controls while seated; medium work is light work with lifting up to
fifty pounds; heavy and very heavy work involves lifting up to or
over one hundred pounds, respectively.”161
In an RFC assessment of Major performed by a SSA contracted
physician, it was determined that Major can lift up to ten pounds
frequently, and up to 20 pounds occasionally. It was also
determined that he can both sit and stand or walk for up to six
hours out of an eight hour day. Such assessments lead to the
conclusion that Major is able to do light work. However, the RFC
assessment also concluded that Major’s ability to push and/or pull
with his lower extremities was limited due to chronic left heel pain
with possible Reflex Sympathy Dystrophy. This suggested a
finding that Major would be limited to sedentary work. However,
as will be discussed in greater detail below, the ALJ at Major’s
hearing chose to disregard the SSA contracted doctor’s assessment
of Major’s lower extremity limitations, and treated Major as being
able to perform light work.
Turning to the grid for light work,162 Major’s status as disabled
or not disabled would be determined by his age, education level
and prior work experience.163 Given Major’s age of 49 at the time
158

Bloch, Medically Centered, supra note 134, at 217; Dubin, Gridlock, supra
note 134, at 976; Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 35.
159
Dubin, Gridlock, supra note 134, at 974-75; Dubin, Labor Market, supra
note 33, at 33.
160
Dubin, Gridlock, supra note 134, at 975 n.149.
161
Id.
162
20 C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart P Appx 2 (Guidelines) § 202, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/cfr20/404/404-app-p02.htm, last visited July 1,
2014.
163
Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 36.
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of the hearing (considered a “younger individual” under the grids’
parlance),164 and given his high school diploma, he would be
considered not disabled under the grids regardless of his prior work
experience.165 Note that the result would have been the same under
the grids had the ALJ determined that the “sedentary work” grid
should be used.166 On the other hand, under the sedentary work
grid, if Major’s hearing had been delayed by approximately four
months until after he turned 50, then the sedentary grid would
result in a finding of disabled.167
The grids add an element of certainty to what was previously
an extremely variable process. Between promulgation of the Social
Security Act Amendments in 1967, and adoption of the grids in
1978, the now mandatory vocational assessment performed as part
of the disability determination involved an often inconsistent
application of the official notice doctrine, as applied to certain U.S.
Department of Labor publications, and the use of vocational expert
testimony at ALJ hearings.168
Nonetheless, at least two serious problems result from current
usage of the grids in disability determinations. First, the grids only
assess exertional limitations on employability.169 However, an
increasingly large percentage of SSD cases involve non-exertional
limitations, including mental health issues, in addition to exertional
ones.170 Pain is another prominent non-exertional limitation that
may impact a claimant’s ability to work, which is not addressed by
the grids.171 Thus, vocational evidence beyond the grids is required
in cases involving such non-exertional limitations.
Second, the grids are based on grossly outdated data derived
from an economy that bears little resemblance to the current one.
When the grids were promulgated in 1978, they were based largely
upon data from the United States Department of Labor’s 1965

164

See Swank, Five Small Steps, supra note 62, at 160.
20 C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart P Appx 2 (Guidelines) § 202.20, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/cfr20/404/404-app-p02.htm, last visited July 1,
2014.
166
20 C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart P Appx 2 (Guidelines) § 201.27, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/cfr20/404/404-app-p02.htm, last visited July 1,
2014.
167
20 C.F.R. Part 404 Subpart P Appx 2 (Guidelines) § 201.12, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/OP_Home/cfr20/404/404-app-p02.htm, last visited July 1,
2014.
168
Dubin, Gridlock, supra note 134, at 950-71.
169
Dubin, Gridlock, supra note 134, at 976; Nathaniel O. Hubley, Note, The
Untouchables: Why a Vocational Expert’s Testimony in Social Security
Disability Hearings Cannot be Touched, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 353, 375 (2008).
170
Dubin, Gridlock, supra note 33, at 943.
171
Id.
165
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Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT).172 The grids have not
been updated since that time. In the words of scholar Jon Dubin:
The grid continues to rely on woefully outdated
assumptions drawn from a snapshot of the United
States' economy nearly a half-century ago. It has not
been meaningfully updated to account for dramatic
changes in today's dynamic and fluid twenty-firstcentury economy and labor market.173
Aside from the question of staleness, other scholars have
questioned the validity of the information relied upon by the SSA
in creating the grids, even when that information was timely.174
In cases where the grids are not determinative, ALJs often rely
on the testimony of vocational experts (VE’s).175 However,
presently, no generally accepted standards exist to determine who
qualifies as a VE in terms of training, experience or supervision.176
Moreover, it is unclear whether the methods employed in the
relatively new field of vocational studies rise to a level of
reliability that warrants the degree of deference ALJs accord to VE
testimony.177 Indeed, VE testimony often relies largely on the same
outdated DOT data that underlies the grids.178 At least one writer
has persuasively argued that the same VE testimony that is relied
on in SSD hearings would be inadmissible in most courts under the
prevailing Daubert test for the admissibility of expert testimony.179
The national focus of SSD’s vocational assessment phase also
seems misguided. As quoted above,180 the Social Security Act
requires a person to be found not to be disabled if there are a
sufficient number of jobs the person can perform in the national
economy, even if no such jobs exist in the region or locality in
which the claimant resides. Yet disabled individuals with no
income generally lack the means to relocate to another part of the
country for a job that is not available in their locality.
Another significant problem with the vocational aspect of the
SSD system is its “all or nothing nature.” Even a claimant who is
found to be disabled, but only eligible to receive SSI benefits, can
look forward to an income stream that is minimally adequate on

172

Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 2-3.
Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 4.
174
Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 4-5.
175
See Hubley, supra note 169, at 375.
176
Dubin, Labor Market, supra note 33, at 968; Hubley, supra note 169, at 355.
177
Hubley, supra note 169, at 355. Id.
178
Id. at 369-70.
179
Id. at 396.
180
See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
173
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which to survive, along with health insurance.181 On the other
hand, an unsuccessful claimant is left largely on her own to find a
job with little if any assistance from the federal government.182 If
this is the result following an ALJ decision, by this time the
claimant has likely been out of the work force for a period of years,
because working while the claim was pending would likely have
jeopardized the applicant’s chances of success.183 The challenge
for a person with at least some level of disability to return to the
workforce after a lengthy absence with little government assistance
is especially daunting.184
Scholars point out the tension between the SSD program’s
recognition that certain people should be excused from the general
social obligation to work to support oneself as a result of disability,
and the Americans with Disabilities Act’s premise that persons
with disabilities have historically been discriminated against in
employment markets, and that such persons often are able and
willing to work given appropriate accommodations from
employers.185 While the SSA does offer a small number of
programs to help to encourage SSD recipients to return to the
workforce,186 few beneficiaries actually take advantage of these
programs.187 Moreover, because the SSD system is funded through
SSI recipients’ income is sufficiently low that most also qualify for the
Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known as Food
Stamps. See United States Department of Agriculture webpage at
http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibility, last visited July 29, 2014.
182
States and localities do offer a patchwork of vocational rehabilitation
programs designed to assist persons with disabilities to obtain employment. See
David Wittenburg, David R. Mann & Allison Thompson, The Disability System
and Programs to Promote Employment for People With Disabilities (2013),
available at http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/2193-9004-2-4/fulltext.html,
last visited August 12, 2014. However, the disjointed nature of such programs
serves to limit greatly their effectiveness. Id. at 3.
183
Gregory Acs, Responding to Long-Term Unemployment 5 (Urban Institute
Paper 2013), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412888responding-to-long-term-unemployment.pdf, last visited July 30, 2014; David
H. Autor, The Unsustainable Rise of the Disability Rolls in the United States:
Causes, Consequences and Policy Options, 9-10 (MIT Working Paper, Nov.
2011)
(hereinafter
Autor,
Unsustainable),
available
at
http://economics.mit.edu/files/7388, last visited July 29, 2014.
184
Id.
185
See, e.g, Id. at 5; Edward Berkowitz, Implications for Income Maintenance
Policy, in Implementing the Americans with Disabilities Act 193, 195 (Jane
West Ed. 1996); Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions
Between the Americans With Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefis
Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003, 1059-75 (1998); Dubin, Labor Market Side,
supra note 33, at 59 & n. 245.
186
See Autor, Unsustainable, supra note 183, at 12 (discussing the Ticket to
Work program); Morton, supra note 62, at 333.
187
Id.
181
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a non-experience rated payroll tax,188 this offers a perverse
incentive for employers not to provide significant workplace
accommodations and other assistance to help disabled adults to
stay in the workforce, rather than to leave employment and seek
SSD benefits.189
Over the decades since the grids were adopted, the United
States’ economy has transformed from a manufacturing based
economy to a service and knowledge based one. In some sense, the
lessened need for physical labor has increased the opportunities for
disabled persons to participate in the labor force.190 Indeed, some
argue that the decreased need for physical labor should result in
fewer favorable disability determinations rather than the trend
toward increased disability findings in recent years.191 However,
the educational requirements for such jobs, as well as the need to
adapt to rapid technological changes have left many disabled
persons, particularly those with cognitive impairments, left behind.
Indeed, there is a broad consensus that the economic crisis of
2008, along with longer term structural changes to the American
economy, placed great strains upon the SSD system, in terms of
large increases in the number of persons applying for benefits, the
number of persons receiving such benefits and the corresponding
fiscal soundness of the system.192 According to a recent
Congressional Research Service study, SSDI applications
increased by 27.3% during the most recent recession (December
2007 – June 2009).193 The fact is that the SSD system is being
called on to provide a “social safety net” for a proportion of the
population far beyond that which was anticipated when the
program was created.
Part of the reason for the current strains on the SSD system is
the inadequacy of the rest of the “social safety net” for many of
those who have recently applied for SSD benefits. For someone
188

Simply stated, experience rating is a method of setting insurance premiums
based upon the insured’s claims history. See J.F. Follman, Jr., Experience Rating
v. Community Rating, 29 THE J. OF INSURANCE 403, 403 (1962) (citations
omitted). Thus, automobile insurance polies are experienced rated: the more
accidents you have, the higher your premiums. By contrast, employers pay the
same percentage of each employee’s wages in SSD taxes regardless of how
many of the employer’s employees file claims for SSD benefits. If employers
could lower their SSD payments by keeping more of their employees on the job,
they might make greater efforts to do so.
189
Autor, Unsustainable, supra note 183, at 8.
190
Id. at 2.
191
Id.
192
See, e.g., Swank, Five Small Steps, supra note 62, at 155. See also Morton,
supra note 62, at 13 & n.70 (2013) (citing studies showing positive correlation
between unemployment rate and SSDI application rate).
193
Id. at 13-14.
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who lost her job due to the 2008 recession, outsourcing or
technological change in his or her field, Unemployment Insurance
(UI) is generally the first place to turn for immediate assistance.
While the government extended the number of weeks one can
collect UI benefits in the wake of the 2008 recession, at present,
one can receive UI benefits for a total of up to 46 weeks, the same
duration that was in effect prior to the 2008 recession.194 Naturally,
it makes sense that one might apply for SSD benefits after one has
exhausted their UI benefits,195 particularly given that there are
virtually no other income support programs available for anyone
other than very poor persons with minor children.196
Many blame the failures of our country’s K-12 education
system for the difficulties unemployed workers have had in
adjusting to the demands of our new economy. Such a critique is
beyond the scope of our present inquiry. However, others connect
these shortcomings and our rapidly changing economy to the need
to develop a more robust system for offering job retraining and
194

See generally Maria Canon & Yang Liu, The Effects of Extending
Unemployment Insurance Benefits , ECONOMIC SYNOPSES (2014), available at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/es/14/ES_16_2014-07-03.pdf,
last
visited July 7, 2014; Jesse Rothstein, Unemployment Insurance and Job Search
in the Great Recession, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2013, pp.
143-210,
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/about/projects/bpea/editions/~/media/Projects/
BPEA/Fall%202011/2011b_bpea_rothstein.PDF, last visited July 7, 2014.
195
At least one researcher has found that extensions in the availability of UI
benefits tend to delay applications for SSD, which in turn saves the SSD
program money, both in the short term, because potential applicants receive UI
rather than SSD benefits, but also in the long term, because some potential SSD
applicants find jobs during the extended period of UI benefits. See Matthew S.
Rutledge, The Impact of Unemployment Insurance Extensions on Disability
Insurance Application and Allowance Rates (Center for Retirement Research at
Boston
College
2011),
available
at
http://crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2011/10/wp_2011-17-508.pdf, last visited July 30, 2014.
196
People with minor children might be eligible for the Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families Program. See generally www.tanfprogram.com, last visited July
7, 2014. Even if ineligible for TANF, very poor individuals will likely qualify
for Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP), formerly known as
food stamps. However, SNAP benefits were only $189 per month for a single
person as of 2014. See United States Department of Agriculture webpage at
http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibility, last visited July 7, 2014. Another
major inducement to apply for SSD benefits came from the fact that those
awarded benefits were also granted health care benefits under the Medicare or
Medicaid program. See Morton, supra note 60, at 16. While this inducement
may be lessened by the Affordable Care Act’s extension of Medicaid benefits
and other low cost health insurance options to many who were previously
ineligible for benefits, id., many states have declined to accept the federal
government’s offer of funding to extend their Medicaid programs. Thus, the
ultimate impact of the ACA on the lure to apply for SSD in order to obtain
health care coverage remains uncertain. Id.
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placement services to the long term unemployed and those with
mild to moderate disabilities,197 who are leading candidates to
apply for SSD without other alternatives to provide income. In any
event, it seems clear that the SSD program is increasingly being
called upon to provide a “social safety net” for displaced workers,
rather than its initial purpose of providing an insurance program
for medical impairments.198
IV.

MAJOR’S CASE

A closer look at Major’s case will further illustrate the fallacy
of the above-described myths, as well as highlight the need for
reform to the SSD system. First, the denial of benefits in Major’s
case silences the myth that it is easy to get SSD benefits. Major has
not received a paycheck in nearly 20 years. He has been diagnosed
by licensed medical doctors with at least the following mental
conditions in addition to his physical limitations: Depression, PostTraumatic Stress Disorder, Anxiety Disorder, Personality Disorder
and Substance Abuse Disorder. He has been involuntarily
committed to inpatient hospitals following suicide attempts on
multiple occasions. The VA has determined that his military
service-connected disabilities limit his earning capacity by 80%,
which is to say nothing about his non-service connected
disabilities. Major was homeless and living on the streets for an
extended period of time prior to his entry in his current
rehabilitation program. If Major’s circumstances are not enough to
qualify him for disability benefits, it is clearly erroneous to
describe obtaining such benefits as easy.
It is also clear that the fact that Major was represented by
counsel at the ALJ hearing did not result in the Agency being
“overmatched,” or an unfair process in Major’s favor. It is true that
Major’s actual advocate at his hearing was a law student rather
than a lawyer. But, for reasons discussed above,199 representation
at the ALJ hearing by a non-lawyer, acting under the supervision
of an attorney seems to be the new norm at ALJ hearings. Also,
while the supervising attorney in Major’s case lacked extensive
experience in SSD litigation, I was involved in a few prior such
cases, and brought more than 25 years of legal practice and
poverty-law practice experience to the case.
Also, as mentioned earlier,200 at the time our clinic agreed to
take Major’s case, with only a week or so to go before his
197

See, e.g., Wittenburg, Mann, & Thompkins, supra note 182.
Autor & Duggan, supra note 66, at 87.
199
See supra notes 123-27, and accompanying text.
200
See supra page 5.
198
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scheduled hearing, the SSA had utterly failed in its duty to develop
a full record to base a decision on.201 All that was contained in the
SSA file were medical records from the local VA for about a year
from the date of Major’s application in late 2010, through the end
of 2011. Thus, the first task that our clinic undertook after getting
Major’s hearing continued was to collect the records from Major’s
numerous hospitalizations and other medical treatment over the
past decade. We knew that Major had been hospitalized at least
several times following suicide attempts, and that such attempts
were factors that could contribute to a finding that Major met a
listing for an affective disorder under section 12.04 of the listings
of impairments.202 Eventually, we were able to compile and submit
more than 1,000 pages of medical records, the volume of which
caused the ALJ, acting sua sponte, to continue the hearing for
another two months to allow him to review this evidence.203
Another task the clinic undertook in order to prepare the case
for hearing was to contact Major’s treating medical providers to
provide opinion letters about Major’s impairments. Although
Major had a physical RFC assessment by an SSA contracted doctor
in the lead up to his case,204 Major had not received notice of a
scheduled SSA psychiatric evaluation due to his homelessness.
Thus, there was no specific mental health evaluation included in
the SSA’s work-up of the case. Opinions from treating doctors
may be particularly important in the SSD process because their
opinions are, by rule, entitled to greater weight than the SSA’s own
doctors, who have only examined the applicant once for purposes
of the SSD claim, and even greater weight than a testifying
medical expert at the ALJ hearing, who has likely only conducted a
paper review of the claimant’s case, and has not examined the
claimant directly.205
Working with Major’s treating doctors proved to be a
challenge, as it often is in SSD cases. Busy doctors naturally prefer
to spend as much of their time treating patients as is possible, and
201

SSD experts Frank Bloch, Jeffrey Lubbers, and Paul Verkuil have contended
that failure to develop a full record on which to decide cases is one of the
greatest failings of the SSD adjudication system. See Bloch, et al., Full and
Fair, supra note 67, at 53. However, rather than recommending adversarial
attorney representation for the SSA as Judge Frye and others have, Bloch,
Lubbers, and Verkuil have proposed adding a non-adversary, SSA “Counselor”
to the hearing process whose primary role would be to ensure that the ALJ has a
complete record upon which to base her decision. Id. at 60.
202
See supra note 143.
203
Carina Weng also points out that many low income SSD applicants, who
have not had regular access to health care, may lack medical records to
document clear disabilities.
204
See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
205
BLOCH ON SOCIAL SECURITY §§ 5:7- 5:8.
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little time writing letters or preparing documents for administrative
purposes. Major regularly saw both a psychiatrist and a
psychologist at the VA, as well as a primary care physician.
Doctors are often particularly overwhelmed by the volume of
patients they are required to treat in public settings such as the VA.
Furthermore, delays and other problems within the VA health care
system were very much in the news during the period relevant to
Major’s case.206
From a lawyer’s perspective, a letter from a doctor is most
effective when it refers to specific evidence from the applicant’s
treatment records, and then connects that evidence to particular
requirements of the SSA Listings. Indeed, many lawyers likely
prefer to sketch out a first draft of such a letter themselves for the
treating physician to review, edit and finalize. By contrast, many
doctors are reluctant to sign a letter drafted for them by an
attorney. While such doctors would prefer to draft their own
letters, they often lack the resources, both in terms of time and
ability to connect medical facts to relevant legal standards, or to
write such assessments in a comprehensible way, like lawyers.
Each of these limitations occurred with Major’s VA doctors. At the
end of the day, we were required to settle for letters that amounted
to little more than conclusory listings of the various mental and
physical conditions Major was diagnosed with. While this was
certainly enough in itself to get Major past the second step of the
sequential evaluation process, there was little in these letters to
help an ALJ find evidence that Major’s impairments met or
exceeded a listing.
Fortunately, Major was also receiving treatment from both a
licensed clinical social worker at his rehabilitation program, as
well as an acupuncturist. Because these professionals were more
willing to work with Major’s lawyers in drafting letters for
submission to the ALJ on Major’s behalf, their letters did a better
job of connecting medical evidence of record to the Listings.
However, because these professionals are not medical doctors,
their opinions hold less weight than those of the SSA doctors, and
the testifying medical expert, even though the letter writers had
treated the applicant, and the other doctors had not.207
Additionally, we were able to have an assessment of Major
performed by a psychologist who had volunteered his services
through the Give an Hour program. This program allows service
206

See, e.g., Severe Report Finds V.A. Hid Waiting Lists, NEW YORK TIMES,
May 29, 2014, at A1 (discussing VA Inspector General’s Report regarding
significant delays in providing medical care at Phoenix VA hospital and efforts
made to cover up the fact of such delays).
207
See generally BLOCH ON SOCIAL SECURITY § 5:7.
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providers to offer free services to needy veterans.208 Though this
professional’s letter also did a thorough job of connecting his
observations of Major’s symptoms to the Listings, it will hold less
weight because of the fact that it was not offered by a professional
who had regularly treated Major.
When one lawyer asks another lawyer about a case they are
handling, the first question the lawyer always asks is: “Who is the
judge?” That question may be even more pertinent in the case of
SSD ALJ hearings than other types of proceedings. The overall
success rate of claimants at the ALJ stage – 56% in 2013209 masks huge disparities in the allowance rate of claims by different
SSD ALJs. For example, in 2011, the Wall Street Journal reported
that dozens of ALJs nationwide awarded benefits in more than
90% of their cases, while many others awarded benefits in fewer
than 20% of their cases.210 In such circumstances, luck of the draw
can make a huge difference. In Major’s case, the Judge ultimately
assigned to the matter denied approximately 42% of the cases he
heard during the most recent fiscal year,211 right about the average
for all ALJs according to the Wall Street Journal.212
Substance abuse turned out to be a huge issue in Major’s case.
Since the enactment of “welfare reform” in 1996, substance abuse,
in and of itself, is not considered a disability that entitles one to
receive SSD benefits, even if it prevents a person from working.213
Moreover, even if the claimant can prove a disability other than
substance abuse, benefits will be denied if substance abuse is
determined to be a “contributing factor material to the
determination of disability.”214 The medical expert in Major’s case
testified that while it was arguable in his opinion whether Major’s
mental health issues met at least some of the listings when Major
was abusing alcohol and drugs, he was convinced that when sober,
Major’s mental health issues did not rise to the level of meeting
any of the listings. The Judge placed great weight on this
testimony, and ultimately reached the same conclusion, that Major
only met the listings when abusing alcohol or drugs, at which time
a finding of disability would be precluded due to the substance
abuse.
208

See GIVE AN HOUR (giveanhour.org, last visited July 25, 2014),
http://www.giveanhour.org.
209
See supra note 35.
210
Id.
211
See supra note 39.
212
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
213
Warnecke Millar & Rebecca Griffin, Recent Development, Adjudicating
Addicts: Social Security Disability, the Failure to Adequately Address Substance
Abuse, and Proposals for Change, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 967, 968-69 (2012).
214
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.935(a), 404.1535(a).
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Because the Judge found that Major did not meet a listing, it
was necessary to move to the vocational aspect of the sequential
evaluation process. This is where the third myth addressed above,
that the SSD system makes genuine assessments of a person’s
ability to work, was proven false. The SSA’s records indicated that
Major had not received any reported earnings from employment
since his discharge from the military nearly 20 years ago. At the
hearing, Major testified that he had worked as a “ranch hand,”
during this period, a position that Major had confided in his
attorneys amounted to little more than being a “gigolo” for a
wealthy ranch owner. In any event, given Major’s RFC as
described above, the Judge and the vocational expert agreed that
Major would not be capable of returning to his prior employment
as a “ranch hand.” The Judge then asked the vocational expert a
hypothetical question designed to determine whether there were
jobs in the national economy in sufficient numbers for a person
with Major’s RFC. The vocational expert responded by identifying
three such jobs: eyedropper assembler,215 addresser216 and
document preparer.217
When the Judge modified his hypothetical to include the
additional limitations recognized by the SSA’s examining doctor
based upon Major’s lower extremity problems,218 the vocational
expert concluded that there would be no jobs in the national
economy in sufficient numbers that Major would be able to
perform. Despite this testimony, the Judge ultimately rejected the
SSA’s own doctor’s conclusions regarding Major’s lower
extremity limitations, and found Major not to be disabled.
Major appealed the ALJ’s decision to the SSA Appeals
Council. It seemed that he had a number of solid issues to raise on
appeal. One was that the Judge erred in disregarding literally all of
the expert opinions provided on Major’s behalf, on grounds that
they were inconsistent with the Judge’s ultimate conclusion that
Major’s mental health disabilities did not raise to the level of a
215

According to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), an eyedropper
assembler “slips rubber bulbs over ends of glass tubes to form eyedroppers.”
See
DOT
739.687-086,
available
at
http://www.occupationalinfo.org/73/739687086.html, last visited July 11, 2014.
216
According
to
DOT
209.587-010,
available
at
http://www.occupationalinfo.org/20/209587010.html, last visited July 11, 2014,
an addresser “[a]ddresses by hand or typewriter, envelopes, cards, advertising
literature, packages, and similar items for mailing.”
217
According
to
DOT
249.587-018,
available
at
http://www.occupationalinfo.org/24/249587018.html, last visited July 11, 2014,
a document preparer “[p]repares documents, such as brochures, pamphlets, and
catalogs, for microfilming, using paper cutter, photocopying machine, rubber
stamps, and other work devices … .”
218
See supra notes 159-163 and accompanying text.
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listing in the absence of substance abuse. It certainly seems to “put
the cart before the horse” to disregard an opinion as being
inconsistent with the judge’s ultimate conclusion. Shouldn’t the
opinion be considered first in reaching the conclusion, or be
disregarded as unreliable on other grounds? Further, the Judge’s
sole reliance on the testifying expert seemed to disregard SSA
policies regarding the weight to be assigned to the opinions of
treating and examining doctors, as opposed to those who have
never met the claimant.219
Additionally, the Judge’s disregard of the findings of SSA’s
own examining doctor relating to additional functional limitations
also seemed suspect. There appears to be no basis upon which to
distinguish between that doctor’s conclusions as to Major’s
abilities to sit, walk, lift, stand, etc., which the Judge credited, and
the other findings regarding Major’s lower extremity limitations,
which the Judge rejected.220
Despite these arguments, the Appeals Council denied Major’s
appeal within days of its submission. This was rather shocking,
given the typically long wait times prior to receiving an Appeals
Council decision.221 Major has now filed for federal court review
of his SSD denial. However, the scope of review of SSD decisions
in federal court is relatively narrow. The court must uphold the
SSA decision as long as there is substantial evidence in the record
to support its conclusion, even if the greater weight of the evidence
would require a decision to the contrary.222
The decision to reject Major’s disability application on the
basis that he is not disabled is most objectionable because it is
unrealistic to assert that people with physical limitations,
depression, PTSD and personality disorders can readily find
employment assembling eyedroppers, addressing envelopes or
cutting up documents for microfilming. In reality, these jobs
simply do not exist, and even if the jobs did exist, no employer
would be likely to offer a job to Major performing one of these
tasks. To a certain extent, Major’s individual lack of employability
is rendered irrelevant to the SSD process by the statutory language
that states whether a particular person would actually be hired for a
job available in sufficient numbers in the National economy is
irrelevant to the disability determination. However, it is just this
type of fictitious determination that cries out for reform of the
system.
219

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2).
The opinions of a physician who has examined the claimant are also
supposed to be given greater weight than those of a doctor who has not
examined the claimant. Id. at § 404.1527(c)(1).
221
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
222
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Bloch on Social Security § 6:2.
220
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SUGGESTED REFORMS

The foregoing discussion serves to refute the three SSD frauds
addressed here. First, it is far from easy for most claimants to
obtain SSD benefits. The frauds perpetrated in New York are
certainly galling, but there is little evidence to suggest that frauds
on this scale are a frequent occurrence throughout the system. The
statistics discussed in Part I of this paper make clear that most
applications for SSD benefits are unsuccessful, and that even
successful claimants often must endure lengthy delays and
complicated procedural hurdles before their claims are approved.
Moreover, there is reason to believe that it is often the most
vulnerable claimants who suffer the most from the lengthy and
complex SSD application process. Certainly efforts should be
made to investigate, punish and deter fraudulent claims. But
restricting access to the system other than through a review of
substantive eligibility standards will likely hurt the most vulnerable
applicants to the greatest degree, and defeat the objectives that
supported adoption of the disability program in the first place.
Similarly, there is no empirical evidence whatsoever that
providing the SSA with its own attorneys would improve outcomes
in SSD cases, at least in terms of obtaining more accurate results.
We do know that a major transition from the current inquisitorial
system to an adversary system would impose significant
transaction costs on an already financially strapped system.
Moreover, paying a whole new staff of SSA attorneys going
forward would impose similar additional costs on the
Administration. Without any solid proof that the system would be
improved, these costs are unwarranted. Rather, as a classic “repeat
player,” the Administration holds significant systemic advantages
over the “one-shotter” claimants in SSD hearings. This is true even
in cases of represented claimants. The representation that claimants
receive often falls short of the high quality legal representation that
would no doubt be afforded to the SSA if it were to employ
attorneys to represent it in all cases. Thus, providing attorney
representation to the SSA would only serve to exacerbate the
advantages the Administration currently has in SSD hearings.
Unlike the first two SSD frauds previously rebutted, the third
fraud, that the SSD adjudication system involves a bona fide and
reliable vocational assessment, calls for change to the current
system. There is little dispute that the fourth and fifth stages of the
SSA’s five step sequential evaluation process rely on grossly
outdated data that was of questionable validity even when it was
current. Further, in lieu of reliable statistical data, the opinions of
the so-called vocational “experts” who testify in the absence of
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such data lack the reliability we demand of expert testimony in
other adjudicatory contexts. Any system that can honestly
conclude that Major, despite all of his ailments, can obtain gainful
employment assembling eyedroppers is a system in serious need of
reform.
Rutgers-Newark law professor Jon Dubin has been perhaps the
most articulate scholar with regard to both understanding and
critiquing the current SSD system in general, 223 and the vocational
aspects of the system in particular.224 Dubin advocates for a “mend
it don’t end it” approach by which the grids would be updated and
improved, but not dispensed of entirely, while recognizing the
significant limitations of the grids, including the staleness of the
data on which grids are based, and the inability to fully establish
the outcome in cases involving non-exertional limitations.225
However, Dubin’s writings, which are now a few years’ old,
fail to adequately account for the political and economic pressures
on the SSD system that have continued to grow along with the size
and cost of the applicant pool and disability rolls in light of the
2008 economic crises and the continuing rapid changes in
American employment markets. Moreover, his optimism that the
SSA can update the grids in a manner that will bring them into line
with the modern economy is belied by Dubin’s descriptions of the
SSA’s repeated failures to do so despite past efforts.226 Finally,
Dubin’s narrow focus on the SSD system fails to acknowledge the
broader inadequacies: 1) in our education system’s ability to
prepare future workers for the modern economy; 2) in our social
safety net for unemployed and displaced workers; and 3) in our
lack of comprehensive national program of vocational and
continuing education for disabled and displaced workers, and a
system to assist such workers with transitional employment
services. Even improved grids will not allow the SSD system, as
currently constructed, to account for all of these failures.
Therefore, the Social Security Act should be amended to
eliminate the vocational aspect of SSD determinations – the fourth
and fifth steps of the sequential evaluation process.227 Thus, SSD
claimants who are not engaged in SGA and who meet or equal a
listing would be granted benefits, while all others would be

223

See Dubin, Issue Exhaustion, supra note 68, at 1289.
See Dubin, Labor Market Side, supra note 33, at 1; Dubin, Overcoming
Gridlock, supra note 134, at 937.
225
Dubin, Labor Market Side, supra note 33, at 62.
226
Id. at 38-47.
227
A similar proposal was offered by the Reagan administration, but was never
enacted. See Dubin, Labor Market Side, supra note 33, at 48.
224
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denied.228 Note that while the SSD listings of impairments are
much more current than the grids, they have not been updated for
more than ten years in the case of physical disorders, and 15 years
in the case of mental disorders.229 Certainly, the listings must be
updated to reflect current medical understandings to the extent the
listings become the final step in the SSD evaluation process.
Updated listings hold out the promise of more accurate disability
determinations in the future.230
I do not intend to overstate the certainty and reliability of the
medical aspects of disability determinations. While medical
decisions based upon listings have an air of scientific realism,
doctors and other scholars critiquing this issue assert that medical
determinations of disability involve a host of discretionary and
indeterminate factors.231 On the other hand, most would agree that
the elements of discretion and uncertainty are even greater at the
vocational stages of the sequential evaluation process.232 Yet over
the past few decades, the number of initial allowances based on the
Listings has plummeted, while the number of allowances based
upon vocational factors has increased dramatically.233 William
Morton, a research analyst who recently prepared a Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress on the Growth of the SSDI
rolls, attributes this to the outdated medical listings (even though
the vocational data SSA relies on is even more outdated).234 In any
event, greater reliance on updated medical listings will likely
decrease uncertainty and indeterminacy of the system without
entirely eliminating it.
Naturally, rendering those who would have been found
disabled at the fourth and fifth stages of the sequential evaluation
ineligible for benefits will greatly reduce those eligible to receive
benefits, potentially solving the economic crisis that the SSD
system currently faces. However, simply cutting off those who
may have previously received benefits is not a humane way to
solve the problem. Consistent with the values behind the ADA,
those found not to be medically disqualified from work would need
to be provided with a robust system of assistance that would
include job training and placement services, supportive
employment services where needed and cash assistance during the
228

I would impose this change prospectively, so no one who is currently
receiving benefits, or who applied under the old system would have the new
standard applied to them.
229
Morton, supra note 62, at 28.
230
Id. at 28-29.
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transition from unemployment to work.
CONCLUSION
The parallels between my proposal and the transition from the
old AFDC program to the current TANF program seem evident.
While “welfare reform” did result in dramatic reductions in
welfare rolls, thus having positive immediate fiscal impact on
government accounts, the broader goals of helping welfare
recipients move from “welfare to work,” and therefore
independence, do not seem to have been achieved.235 Limiting
SSD to those who can meet a listing would certainly have the
impact of reducing the rolls, and therefore address the fiscal and
other public pressures on the system. However, it would only do so
in a humane and socially responsible way if the vocational aspects
of the system were replaced with a system of vocational training,
rehabilitation and job placement services that effectively assist
displaced workers in returning to the workforce, while also
providing income support for those who are unable to do so despite
good faith efforts.
Certainly, enacting a new major entitlement program of this
scale is unlikely in the present political climate. However, as long
as the SSD system is the only available social support for workers
displaced by a combination of economic change and mental and
physical limitations, the program will be stretched beyond its
capacity to address compelling need beyond the scope of what the
program was ever intended to address.
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